We discuss the issue of time consistency of monetary policy. We develop a simple and intuitive procedure to derive analytically the unconditionally optimal (UO) policy in a general linear-quadratic set-up, a perspective stressed by Taylor (1979) and Whiteman (1986) . We compare the UO perspective on optimal monetary policy with alternative approaches. We use our approach in simple backward-and forward-looking models and argue that the UO perspective is worthy of renewed interest. JEL Classification: E20, E32, F32, F41.
Introduction
brought into sharp focus the issue of time inconsistency of optimal policy in macroeconomic models with forward-looking behavior and rational expectations. In so doing, they transformed the debate on how 'good'dynamic policy ought to be formulated and conducted. Many insights, and literatures, grew out of the Kydland and Prescott paper; a key insight, of course, was the desirability of rules in the conduct of policy. The question is:
How should one form these rules? In this paper we take up a theme from Taylor (1979) and pursued in Whiteman (1986) . They proposed searching for policies, under rational expectations, which maximize the unconditional expectation of the government's objective function. More recently, however, an alternative perspective has been adopted in theoretical research on time-consistent monetary policy. Woodford (2003) , concerned with the formulation of credible policies, proposes a dynamic optimization-based method for solving for optimal policy, which he has labelled a "timeless perspective for optimal policy" (TP-policy).
However, the debate continues as to the appropriate criterion for policymakers.
For example, see the contributions of Soderlind (1999) , Blake (2001) , McCallum (2002, 2006) and Walsh (2005) ; Currie and Levine (1993) is an early recognition and analysis of many of the issues that have arisen in the subsequent literature.
First, in section 2, we exposit di¤erent ways of addressing the time inconsistency issue. We …rst look at TP-policy strategies as this usefully sets out the key issues in forward-looking models. We also look brie ‡y at some of the concerns with the TP approach. However, our main focus is to show how one can derive analytically policies that minimize the unconditional expectation of losses, what we refer to as unconditionally optimal policy or optimal unconditional 2 continuation policy ( UO-policy) . This is the …rst contribution of this paper. To accomplish this, as we shall see, involves taking expectations over all feasible initial conditions in constructing the optimal policy program. We derive these optimal continuation policies in a general linear-quadratic set-up. For concreteness, we then specialize these results to recover the policies advocated by Blake (2001) and Jensen and McCallum (2002) and proved to be optimal by Whiteman (1986).
Whiteman's proof of optimality is somewhat algebraically involved whilst our approach is straightforward, intuitive and easy to implement and generalize. We also explain the sense in which consumers'discount rates do not matter when we construct UO-policy, an observation going back to Taylor's (1979) contribution but which has not been formally set out.
In section 3 we pursue further the potential rationale for adopting UO-policies.
In formulating optimal policies it may seem natural to adopt as the criterion of policy the conditional expected discounted value of losses. However, as is well known, when there are forward-looking structural relationships the issue of time consistency is present. One approach is to minimize conditional losses subject to policy rules that have constant coe¢ cients. However, as we show,
such rules are what we call 'conditionally inconsistent' (i.e., the parameters of the optimal (simple) rule are dependent on initial conditions). This is a form of time-inconsistency but it is useful to give it a separate label to distinguish it from the case where the form of the optimal rule (e.g., the nature of the …rst-order conditions for a policy optimum) are di¤erent in some start-up period(s) 1 .
One response to this di¢ culty is simply to 'ignore' the part of discounted expected losses that re ‡ects these initial conditions; the timeless perspective o¤ers a justi…cation for this approach and, as a result, adopts as the criterion of policy the conditional variance of the arguments in the loss function. However, that is not the only response to this di¢ culty, and it may not be the most natural. If one adopts the unconditional value of losses as the criterion of policy, one recovers rules for policy that are time consistent, conditionally consistent and optimal within the class of policies under investigation.
In the case when the equations describing the economy are purely backwardlooking it may seem that the UO-perspective has little to o¤er. In that case optimal policy, calculated using the discounted conditional loss function, is timeconsistent (and conditionally consistent). However, even in this situation it may be possible to argue that minimizing unconditional losses is still desirable. We
show that there is a trade-o¤ between the best policy given the initial conditions and the 'most desirable'distribution from which the initial conditions are drawn.
In addition, we show that the UO-policy converges to the one which maximizes the conditional loss function when the time discount rate tends to unity. In general, it is an interesting, and important, philosophical question whether we should discount the welfare of future generations, and how we should de…ne the aggregate discount rate. Such issues were famously noted by Ramsey (1928) and more recently by Somers (1971) and Barro (1999) .
Finally, in section 4 we brie ‡y recap our key arguments and conclude.
Di¤erent ways to cope with time inconsistency
Most macroeconomic models that are useful for policy analysis seem to face the issue of time inconsistency. Hence, monetary policy analysis has for a long time recognized that one needs to address the incentives/criterion facing policymakers.
Early suggestions included appointing a conservative central banker, proposed by Kenneth Rogo¤, or the contracting approach urged by Carl Walsh. Woodford 4 (2003) proposes that policymakers should adopt the timelessly optimal policy; that is, the policy that would have been decided upon for the current period had such a binding decision been taken in…nitely far in the past. The timelessly optimal rule emphasizes both commitment and ‡exibility; policymakers ought to implement policies to which it would have been optimal to commit, had a binding decision been made far in the past. However, that does not require policymakers to apply rules regardless of what other changes may occur in the economy. If there are structural changes, for instance, then policy ought to be employed as if that change had been known about in…nitely far in the past. It is important to note that this perspective on optimal policy, like those employed below, remains time inconsistent in the sense of Kydland and Prescott (1977) . However, they are time consistent in a more limited sense; the policy is sustainable, since it may perform better than discretionary policy, which the government will implement should it deviate from commitment. McCallum and Jensen (2006) emphasized this point and we take it up below.
The model
We turn now to formalize the timeless perspective in a general linear-quadratic framework. Consider a discounted quadratic loss function of the form
E t is the expectations operator conditional on information up through date t, is the time discount factor, x t is a vector of target variables, x is a vector of target values which could depend on disturbance terms, and Q is a symmetric, positive de…nite matrix.
We de…ne
Here z t is a vector of non-predetermined endogenous variables, the value of which may depend upon both policy actions and exogenous disturbances at date t, Z t is a vector of predetermined endogenous variables (lags of variables that are included in z t and i t ) and i t is a vector of policy instruments, the value of which is chosen in period t:
We further assume that the evolution of the endogenous variables z t and Z t is determined by a system of simultaneous equations
where B = 0 B ; C = 0 C and s t is a vector of exogenous disturbances.
The policy maker minimizes the loss function (2.1) subject to constraint (2.2) and given initial conditions (x t ; s t ). He searches for a policy rule of the general
3)
It will generally be the case that the vector = 
Timeless-perspective policy
One way to construct a policy which does not depend on time or initial conditions has been proposed in Woodford (2003) . The following algorithm, which is wellknown, will recover the optimal policy from a timeless perspective:
6
Step 1: Write the conditionally expected discounted Lagrangian: Step 2: Write the …rst-order conditions with respect to the endogenous variables, x t+j
Step 3: Ensure commitment to the policy program by 'ignoring' the …rst-order conditions for period zero (2.6) and replace them with (2.7):
The following example demonstrates this algorithm in practice.
Example 2.1. Following Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) consider the loss function
and a forward-looking Phillips curve given by 2.9) where t is in ‡ation at time t, y t is the output gap, and e t is a stationary identically distributed shock process with …nite 2 variance, 2 : The Lagrangian for the policy problem may be written as TP policy may be thought of as the 'opposite'of discretionary policy in the following sense. While discretionary policy gives the largest weight to utility in period zero, e¤ectively ignoring the consequences for the future, the TP policy minimizes the discounted value of all future losses ignoring the value of initial conditions, the distribution of which depends on the policy adopted. In the following section we will discuss the policy which, from our perspective (see also McCallum (2002, 2006) ), represents a mixture of those two approaches as it minimizes the loss function "on average" or across all possible initial conditions. More precisely, it minimizes the integral of the loss function (2.1) over the distribution of initial values which is itself generated by the chosen policy.
Unconditionally optimal policy
Soderlind (1999) analyzes 'optimal simple rules' in a rational expectations model and argues that the optimal policy parameters depend on initial values.
For instance, in the example just considered, Woodford's timeless perspective methodology always dominates when y t 1 = 0, for, in this case, the timeless perspective policy is the same as the optimal ('time inconsistent') policy. Jensen and McCallum (2002) and Blake and Kirsanova (2004) , using the methodology described in Soderlind (1999) , provide examples where, for particular initial conditions, there is a time consistent linear policy which results in smaller losses than TP-policy "on average". We shall return to this point in more detail below.
Since we cannot …nd, in general, time-consistent policy which is dominant for all initial conditions, it is natural to search for a class of policies which do well, in some sense, "on average", in e¤ect treating initial conditions as a new random 9 variable. The policy which we now seek to justify is one which minimizes the unconditional expectation of the loss function; this is equal to the expectation over all possible initial states of the economy (Taylor, 1979) . More formally, then, the optimal policy from a timeless perspective that we are looking for can be de…ned as a policy rule 0 =(
) which minimizes the unconditional expectation ( e E) of the loss function (2.1), subject to constraint (2.2):
We shall call such a policy "Unconditionally Optimal" and denote it UO-policy.
This basic approach to policy evaluation, focussing on the asymptotic variance of the arguments in a loss function, has been adopted many times recently Woodford (1997, 1998) , Woodford (1999) , Clarida, Gali and Getler (1999) , Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000) and Kollman (2002)). However, there is now much evidence to suggest that UO-policy and TP-policy are di¤erent.
First, in a little cited contribution, Whiteman (1986) has shown that, for precisely the economy considered in Example 2.1, the policy which minimizes the unconditional loss function is given by (2.14)
rather than by (2.12) which corresponds to the TP-policy. Using a numerical algorithm Blake (2001) shows that policy (2.14) satis…es the …rst-order and secondorder conditions for an unconditional optimum. Jensen and McCallum (2002) also make this point by computing the exact losses numerically for the case just analyzed.
Second, the Lagrangian constructed in Woodford's timeless perspective methodology depends on the consumers'discount factor, but the optimal policy which minimizes unconditional losses does not. The formal statement of that result is provided in Proposition (2.2) which we ascribe to John Taylor as he is the …rst explicit reference (within the context of linear rational expectations models) to the issue of unconditionality emphasized above of which we are aware. 
Here, l t denotes the period loss function.
Proof. It follows immediately that,
Hence, we have proved that the same policy is unconditionally optimal for L t ( ) for any 2 (0; 1)
2) is additionally interesting as it demonstrates that the same policy is unconditionally optimal for all households, regardless of their individual time discount factors. For example, we may consider an overlapping generations economy populated with individuals whose life-time utility function has the form
where (j) represents the time discount factor for j years ahead. If we assume that the time discount rate does not depend on current welfare, the unconditionally optimal policy would not depend on the time-discounting function
The 'best-on-average'criterion avoids the need for one to take a stand on what is the appropriate social discount rate; see the interesting discussions of these issues in Barro (1999) and Somers (1971) .
Blake (2001), following the earlier approach of Taylor (1979) , emphasizes that the unconditionally optimal time-consistent policy should coincide with a TP policy as the policymaker's discount factor approaches unity. However a formal proof of that assertion has not been provided so far 3 . We will provide one in the next section.
Formulating unconditionally optimal policies
In this section we shall show that a policymaker aiming to minimize unconditional losses should formulate an unconditional criterion to begin with and then calculate the …rst-order necessary conditions. In other words one should not try …rst to …nd the optimality conditions for a time inconsistent or conditional policy and then make the rule time-invariant by ignoring …rst period constraints. It would be as if one were trying to …nd an optimum of a composite function, that is arg min f (g(x)), by writing the …rst-order conditions for g(x) only. From an unconditional perspective, the correct approach is to apply the unconditional expectations operator in formulating the policy Lagrangian and then derive the optimality conditions.
Hence, we propose the following methodology:
Step 1: Write the conditional Lagrangian (2.4).
Step 2: Re-formulate this as an unconditional Lagrangian:
using the property of unconditional expectation: e Ex t = e Ex t+j , we can write
which corresponds to the Hamiltonian
Step 3: Write the …rst-order conditions for the optimal timeless policy with respect to all endogenous variables;
Condition (2.16) implies the following dynamics for the Lagrange multipliers
The general conclusion can be formulated in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.3. The …rst order conditions (2.17) are the necessary conditions for problem 2.13, subject to 2.2.
Proof.
The proof follows immediately by applying Pontryagin's Maximum Principle.
We contrast equations (2.17) with (2.7) above. It is easy to see that TP-policy tends to UO-policy when discount rate tends to unity,
As we shall see, Proposition 2.3 is exactly the justi…cation required to demonstrate that the Blake-Jensen-McCallum result is the policy to minimize unconditional losses.
Example with forward looking Phillips Curve
Example 2.4. We search for an unconditionally optimal policy which minimizes the loss function 2.18) subject to the constraint
19)
We formulate the time-dependent Lagrangian
Since we search for the unconditionally optimal policy, we need to minimize the "unconditional" Lagrangian, which means we must formulate the problem using the unconditional expectation of the Lagrangian, J t :
The unconditional expectations operator has the following property 8t; j; e Ex t = e Ex t+j which implies that e EE t t+j t+j+1 = e E t t 1 : The unconditional Lagrangian may then be rewritten as
The corresponding Hamiltonian is
The …rst order conditions follow:
These relations can be written as
This is the optimal program proposed by Blake-Jensen-McCallum, and proved to be optimal by Whiteman (1986) . 
where d is the Cartesian product of (du t k ) 1 k=0 ; and where the u t are the basic i.i.d. shocks with zero mean and unit second moment.
We emphasize that d is given exogenously and does not change with policy.
To maximize the integral we need to maximize the corresponding Hamiltonian, which is the expression under the integral, z(p). Intuitively this is plausible as the policy which minimizes the objective in every state of nature (the components of the sum), will also minimize the expectation (i.e., the sum or integral). Hence, we employ the …rst order conditions for the Hamiltonian,
For instance, if we assume that the e t = u t , where shocks u t are (serially) uncorrelated in example 2.4, the information space at time t will be described by the pair (y t 1 ; e t ): It follows that the dynamic relation for the output gap is given by y t = y t 1 + e t ; (2.22) where and are endogenously chosen policy parameters. Equation (2.22) in turn implies the following relation between the output gap and shocks
Therefore, the loss function can be explicitly expressed in terms of the policy parameters and the realization of shocks, L t ( ; ; u t ): The unconditional expectation then will be represented as
Instead of calculating the explicit expression (2.24) for unconditional losses in terms of policy parameters and shocks, we may employ the Lagrange method and write the unconditional Lagrangian in the form of (2.25)
y t+j e t+j ) + t+j ( y t+j + y t+j 1 + e t+j ) d :
The …rst order conditions with respect to policy parameters, and ; will reveal that the Lagrange multiplier in period t + 1, t+1 is uncorrelated with the information set at time t , (E t t+1 e t = 0, E t t+1 y t = 0); and hence it is expected to be zero, E t t+j = 0: Therefore, expression (2.22) is not binding and expression (2.25) can be simpli…ed as in (2.20) .
Finally, we note that in general measure d has the following property: If x t and y t can be represented as linear combinations of shocks,
A i u t i and
which always exists when
are bounded. For further details see Hamilton (1999) .
Some Arguments in Favour of Unconditional Expectation
In this section we will argue that a credible policy should satisfy certain key properties. If one aims to construct a policy program which is the result of maximization of government objectives, then that policy should have the following
properties: First, it should be time consistent; second, the same rules should be de…ned for all initial conditions; and …nally, it should maximize the government objective function on the class of policies under consideration. Formally, the optimal policy should satisfy the following:
De…nition 3.1. Policy is "time consistent" i¤ 8j > 0, (t) = (t + j):
Policy is "conditionally consistent" i¤ it does not depend on initial condition, 8x t ; s t ; (x t ; s t ) = (0; 0):
Policy is sustainable with respect to loss function L in the class ; 2 ; i¤ it is the best one in this class,
In other words, one requires that the policy which maximizes a given objective function should depend neither on time (this property is, of course, simply time consistency) nor on initial conditions (we call this "conditional consistency"). If "conditional consistency" is violated, the government has an incentive to revise the policy rule as initial conditions change and this imposes a credibility problem similar to the one created by the violation of time consistency.
To illustrate the de…nitions, we can say that in a pure (linear) backwardlooking model (a model lacking non-predetermined endogenous variables, z t ) the optimal policy is both time consistent and conditionally consistent. Kydland and Prescott (1977) have shown that in models with forward looking variables policy which minimizes the conditional loss function is time inconsistent. In view of our analysis, we may add that it is "conditionally consistent" and sustainable with respect to the conditional loss function on the class of linear policies. TPpolicy is both time and conditionally consistent by construction, however it does not minimize the conditional loss function for almost all initial conditions and therefore it is not sustainable with respect to the conditional loss function.
The principle di¤erence between forward-looking or mixed and pure backward-looking constraints
We now underline an important principal di¤erence between forward looking and backward looking models. It is well known that the optimal policy in an economy with only backward looking constraints is time consistent in contrast to models which contain some forward-looking components. In this section we will show that while the best conditional policy for a pure backward-looking economy is the same for all initial conditions, this is not the case for time consistent policies in forward-looking economies.
In particular, the policy parameters of the time consistent policy which minimize the conditional discounted losses depend on initial conditions. This was noted in Soderlind (1999) and demonstrated numerically in Blake and Kirsanova (2004) , where Woodford's timeless perspective policy is shown to be conditionally optimal when the economy starts from steady state, (y t 1 = 0): However, clearly that is a special case. Therefore, conditionally optimal time consistent policy is subject to the same time inconsistency problem as the best time inconsistent policy itself; as conditions change, the policymaker has an incentive to revise the policy-rules and the credibility issue is not eradicated.
Example with pure Backward Looking Phillips Curve
In the following example, the Phillips curve is purely backward-looking. In this example, the optimal conditional policy is time and conditionally consistent and sustainable with respect to the conditional loss function, which makes this policy credible.
Example 3.4. The problem, then, is described by the loss function (3.1) and the simple backward-looking Phillips relation (3.2) 4 :
2)
The unconditional Lagrangian may be formulated following the approach outlined earlier, and so we write the …rst order conditions @z @y t = y t + t = 0;
We now compare two policies: The …rst which is conditionally the best 3.4) and the second, which is unconditionally the best
For simplicity we consider the case when the e t shocks are i.i.d. with zero mean and …nite second moment, 2 : The calculations are relatively straightforward and we relegate them to the appendix. As we show there, the best conditional and the best unconditional outturns for in ‡ation and output may be represented as follows:
where
, for the best unconditional policy, and
for the best conditional policy. The distribution of initial in ‡ation can then be shown to be given by
It follows that in ‡ation has lower dispersion when the government implements the unconditionally optimal policy.
That is, the unconditional loss function is given by 3.6) and this attains a minimum when d = d u .
Similarly, the conditional loss function can be shown to be
In this example the asymptotic variance of output and in ‡ation is lower under the unconditionally optimal plan, as compared with the plan that minimizes the conditional discounted loss function. This is clear from equation (3.6) . So, even in this simple example, where optimal policy is time consistent, depending on one's perspective on the appropriate criterion of government (and the appropriateness of discounting) one could still o¤er a justi…cation for unconditionally optimal programs.
Policy (3.4) , denoted p c , minimizes L t ( t 1 ) for any given initial in ‡ation, t 1 = t 1 (p; e t ); which depends on the policy adopted and the history of realized shocks, (e t ) ; while policy (3.5) 
, where dF ( t 1 ) is a measure of initial in ‡ation rates; in other words, it minimizes the loss function "on average". The conventional wisdom is that L t ( t 1 ; e t ; p c ) < L t ( t 1 ; e t ; p); 8p; t 1 ; e t . What we have argued
The di¤erence is explained by considering what may be thought of as 'externalities'; that is, policy will in ‡uence in ‡ation and output in a certain way so that the policymaker determines the distribution of initial conditions, F ( t 1 ). So, if past policymakers had implemented the best conditional policy rule, the current generation would face a less favorable distribution of initial conditions, F ( t 1 ; e t ); than if the government had implemented the best unconditional policy. Thus, there is a trade-o¤ between the best policy and the most desirable distribution from which the initial conditions are drawn. On average the economy is better o¤ when the government implements the unconditionally optimal policy.
Conditionally optimal policy p c is credible if government minimizes the conditional loss function, E t L t ; as is unconditionally optimal policy, p u ; if government minimizes the unconditional loss function, e EL t : Which policy the government should adopt is a rather philosophical question as is the value of the 21 social discount factor (see for example Somers (1971) and Barro (1999) ). However, although in this example both policies are credible and sustainable, that is not so when forward looking structural equations are present. We now turn to that case.
Example with Forward-looking Phillips curve
We consider an optimal policy for problem (2.18) , (2.19) and policy in the form of (3.7)
which nests the timeless perspective policy when c = 1; and the unconditionally optimal policy when c = : For simplicity, let e t be i.i.d. with zero mean and …nite dispersion, 2 :
At any time period t the information is described by the pair (y t 1 ; e t ); and without loss of generality the output gap, y t ; may be written as 3.8) which in combination with (3.7) results in a dynamic relation for in ‡ation as follows:
The Phillips curve (2.19) implies y t = t (c d) y t + e t ; which together with (3.9) yields
We may now solve for coe¢ cients d and combining (3.8) with (3.10)
Following Blake (2001) we can calculate the unconditional expectation of the loss function
which achieves its minimum when c = :
Now we will calculate the conditional expected discounted value of losses.
Integrating forward on our expression for output we get that 3.12) which allows us to compute the conditional second moments of the output gap terms
It follows then that:
23 If x t 1 = 0;the conditional expectation (3.14) reduces to (3.15) 3.15) which achieves its minimum when c = 1; which corresponds to Woodford's timeless perspective policy.
However, in general the best policy, c, depends on the three variables (e t ; x t 1 ; ) and is not invariant to initial conditions. Below we provide the numerical calculation for optimal c: 
Loss function
Conditional expectation, e t =1, σ=1
Timless perspective, c=1
Unconditionally optimal, c=β conditionally best time-consistent 
Discussion and conclusion
In this paper we develop a simple and intuitive procedure for uncovering the unconditionally optimal policy that is applicable to a wide variety of examples currently of interest in the literature. UO-policy is time-consistent, conditionally consistent and optimal on the class of rules under consideration. We argued that this perspective on optimal policy formulation is attractive and in this we seem to be going back to a perspective urged by Taylor (1979) and Whiteman (1986) in seminal analyses of policy formulation in linear, rational expectations macroeconomic models. In a particular monetary policy example we showed that UO-policies result, on the average, in higher welfare when one uses the asymptotic loss function as the criterion of policy. However, we also demonstrated that even when time-consistency is not a problem (when the economy, unrealistically, is characterized purely by backward-looking dynamic relations) one may still o¤er a justi…cation for the UO perspective on policy formulation. In the example in section 3 the key di¤erence between the two classes of policies (conditionally optimal versus unconditionally optimal) showed up in the distribution of initial in ‡ation. This appendix spells out the analysis of the model economy discussed in Section 3.2 of the paper. We recall that the e t shocks are i.i.d. and distributed as N (0;
2 ):
Consequent on the recursive structure of the model, we note that at any point in time, t, the state of the economy may be described by the pair ( t 1 ; e t ).
Therefore, government policy may be written as (5.1)
Then, combining (5.1) with (3.2) we receive
Best unconditional policy
Let us now consider the best unconditional policy (3.5) . Combining this with (5.3) we receive
Plugging (5.1) and (5.2) into (5.4) we receive (5.5) 5.5) which implies the following restrictions for coe¢ cients and
>From these relations we receive that:
Best conditional policy
We now consider the best conditional policy, (3.4) . Combining this with (5.3) we receive (5.10)
(5.13)
Unconditional expectation
We use (5.9), (5.13) to express unconditional expectations in term of in ‡ation
We can …nd E 2 t by applying the unconditional operator to the square of (5.8) or (5.12) .
which results in (5.15)
>From (5.12) we may easily conclude that the dispersion of t is smaller when d is smaller, and that therefore it is smaller when the government employs the unconditionally optimally policy as compared with the conditionally optimal policy.
Plugging (5.15) into (5.14) we receive the …nal expression for unconditional expectation of the loss criterion:
It is then easy to show that
29 which is zero when d = d u
Conditional expectation
Now we can calculate the conditional expectation of the loss function, which can be simpli…ed as (5.16) 5.16) where
Integrating (5.17) forward we receive
which implies
We may simplify this last expression usefully in the following way:
Finally, the unconditional expectation can be calculated as follows:
And …nally, it can then be shown that this can be simpli…ed as
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